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Abstract
This paper investigates the effects of monetary policy on income inequality in a Schum-
peterian growth model with endogenous human capital accumulation and household het-
erogeneity. The source of heterogeneity arises from both unequal distributions of (tangible)
wealth and (intangible) human capital. We find that inflation unambiguously lowers economic
growth rate, whereas its impact on the income inequality is quite diverse, depending on the
relative dispersions of human capital and wealth, and the response of the relative interest-
wage income share to inflation. Inflation may increase income inequality when the dispersion
of human capital dominates (is dominated by) that of wealth, and the relative interest-wage
income share is decreasing (increasing) in inflation rate. One interesting scenario in our anal-
ysis is that the model can generate a non-monotonic U-shaped relationship between income
inequality and inflation. Moreover, our quantitative example shows that this U-shaped rela-
tionship is likely to occur in a reasonable range of parameter configuration and the threshold
level of inflation is consistent with the current empirical findings using the U.S. data.
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1 Introduction
It is widely acknowledged that people in the economy reap unequal benefits of economic
growth (e.g., Kuznets (1955), Alesina and Rodrik (1994), and Piketty (2014)). An important
question centers on how the policy instruments, which aim to promote economic growth, are able
to affect the distribution of personal income? Do these policies exacerbate or mitigate income
inequality? One strand of recent literature has shown a sizable impact of monetary policy on
the long-run economic growth (see, for example, Chu and Cozzi (2014) and Arawatari, Hori and
Mino (2018)). A few other studies have also started to investigate its micro-economic implications
on the well-being of the population from different income groups, focusing on the issue of its
impact on income inequality (e.g, Chu, Cozzi, Fan, Furukawa and Liao (2019a) and Zheng (2020)).
At the same time, an increasing number of empirical studies have documented a high corre-
lation between education inequality (human capital inequality) and income inequality. On the
one hand, Castelló and Doménech (2002), Checchi (2004), and Castelló-Climent (2010) reported
that the human capital inequality is significantly correlated with income inequality in a wider
cross-country perspective. On the other hand, empirical findings such as Rodríguez-Pose and
Tselios (2009) and Hasanov and Izraeli (2011) indicated that high levels of inequality in educa-
tional attainment is associated with higher income inequality across regions within the E.U. and
the U.S. economy. Surprisingly, to the best of our knowledge, very few existing theoretical mod-
els have taken human capital heterogeneity into account.1 In this regard, our study intends to fill
this void by incorporating human capital into a scale-invariant Schumpeterian model with cash
constraint on R&D.
This study follows the previous research (i.e., Chu and Cozzi (2014), Huang, Chang and Ji
(2015), He and Zou (2016) and Zheng, Huang and Yang (2019)) to model money demand by im-
posing the cash-in-advance (CIA) constraint on entrepreneurs’ R&D activities.2 It enables us to
investigate the effects of inflation on economic growth and income inequality. We model house-
holds’ heterogeneity via unequal levels of wealth endowment and human capital. The different
wealth endowment gives rise to an unequal distribution of households’ interest income, in part
causing the income inequality. In the presence of human capital heterogeneity, the households
can choose different levels of education, devote themselves into either high-skilled or low-skilled
labor, and consequently receive different amounts of wage income. Accordingly, by taking into
1One notable exception is Jin (2009) who built an AK endogenous growth model and considered an exogenous skill
heterogeneity. We hereby complement Jin (2009) by considering the link between money and R&D, the endogenous
human capital accumulation, and the fact that R&D is a skill-intensive sector which requires a huge amount of
investment in human capital.
2This approach is supported by many empirical findings. For example, early empirical literature such as Himmel-
berg and Petersen (1994) reported a strong relationship between R&D and cash flows in the U.S. firms. More recently,
Brown, Martinsson and Petersen (2012) found that the feature of R&D’s susceptibility to financing constraint and
binding liquidity forces firms to hold enormous amounts of cash for R&D smoothing, and Bakker (2013) documented
the existence of cash-requirement for R&D investment even for the giant companies like Apple, Google, Facebook,
and Amazon.
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account two dimensions of heterogeneity, our model can explore the monetary effects on the in-
teraction of households’ interest income and wage income inequality, and how both inequalities
contribute to total income inequality.
In contrast to the roughly consistent empirical findings on inflation and growth,3 the nexus
between inflation and income inequality is rather inconclusive. Early studies by Edwards (1997),
Al-Marhubi (1997), and Albanesi (2007) found a positive linkage between inflation rate and in-
come inequality across countries, while Cutler, Katz, Card and Hall (1991), Jäntti (1994) and
Mocan (1999) confirmed the progressive effect of inflation on income distribution in the U.S. over
the past decades. Interestingly, some recent empirical studies argue that the relationship between
inflation and income inequality found in previous studies tends to depend on the level of infla-
tion. They found positive correlations at high inflation levels (using the data from developing
countries) and negative correlations at low inflation levels (applying the data from multiple de-
veloped countries). Of importance, most of the previous studies did not explicitly control for the
non-linearity in their regression models (Galli and van der Hoeven (2001) and Monnin (2014)).
Galli and van der Hoeven (2001) and Auda (2010) reported a U-shaped relationship between in-
flation and income inequality, and Monnin (2014) either found a U-shaped relationship in OECD
countries.4 Besides, Bulírˇ (2001) and Balcilar, Chang, Gupta and Miller (2018) also found U-
shaped results from the U.S. data. Our model is able to generate predictions that are supported
by the above empirical findings.
Our results show that a higher nominal interest rate (inflation) unambiguously lowers eco-
nomic growth rate, while its impact on income inequality is diverse. In particular, we find that
a rise in the nominal interest rate (inflation) exacerbates income inequality when the relative
dispersion of human capital to wealth is greater (smaller) than the relative interest-wage income
share conditional on this relative income share being decreasing (increasing) in the nominal in-
terest rate. Intuitively, on one hand, a rise in the nominal interest rate dampens economic growth
rate and in turn real interest rate via increasing the cost of R&D activities due to the CIA con-
straint; on the other hand, it also generates an ambiguous change on the wage income-to-wealth
ratio. The two effects jointly determine the movement of the relative income share. If the for-
mer effect dominates, the relative income share is decreasing, leading to an increase (decrease)
in wage income (interest income) share. Suppose the economy is endowed with a sufficiently
high dispersion of human capital to wealth, an increasing weight (i.e., wage income share) on
a larger dispersion of human capital raises the income inequality. If the latter effect is negative
and dominates, it leads conversely to an increasing (decreasing) interest income (wage income)
3Vaona (2012) and Barro (2013) showed a monotonically decreasing relationship between inflation rate and eco-
nomic growth rate. Some other studies such as López-Villavicencio and Mignon (2011) and Kremer, Bick and Nautz
(2013) showed that when the inflation rate is low, an insignificant negative linkage or a positive linkage between
inflation rate and economic growth rate can be found, while when the inflation rate is high, a robust and significantly
negative linkage holds.
4Chu, Cozzi, Fan, Furukawa and Liao (2019a) found an inverted-U impact of inflation on income inequality from
their cross-country regressions.
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share. Suppose now the economy is endowed with a sufficiently low dispersion of human capital
to wealth, a declining (wage income) share of a lower dispersed human capital still raises income
inequality.
Finally, we arrive at an interesting scenario that a U-shaped relation between income inequal-
ity and nominal interest rate (inflation) might emerge. If we hold everything else the same but
only switch the sign in the above endowment condition to let the relative dispersion of human
capital to wealth be smaller (greater) than the relative income share, we find that this endow-
ment condition is now subject to change, depending on the status quo nominal interest rate. In
particular, there will be a threshold level of nominal interest rate below and above which income
inequality would decrease and increase in response. A rise in nominal interest rate, henceforth,
may lead to monotonically decreasing income inequality if the interest rate never reaches the
threshold within its feasible range; otherwise, a U-shaped relationship would emerge if the nom-
inal interest rate is able to exceed the threshold thorough its feasible range. The prediction of
a U-shaped relationship is consistent with the aforementioned empirical findings. Moreover,
by calibrating our model to the U.S. economy, we also numerically show that our model can de-
liver this U-shaped relationship under reasonable parameter configuration whereby the threshold
nominal interest rate (inflation) coincides with the empirical estimates.
Our study is related to the strand of literature investigating income disparity in the R&D-
based growth models, such as Chou and Talmain (1996), Zweimüller (2000), Foellmi and Zweimüller
(2006), García-Peñalosa and Wen (2008), Chu and Cozzi (2018), Jones and Kim (2018), and
Aghion, Akcigit, Bergeaud, Blundell and Hémous (2019). These studies mainly focus on the
relationship between income (wealth) inequality and innovation-driven growth, whilst our paper
tries to answer the question of how the monetary policy can affect income inequality by incor-
porating both wealth and human capital inequalities. In addition, our paper is closely related to
Chu, Cozzi, Fan, Furukawa and Liao (2019a), who explored the impact of inflation on innovation,
growth and income inequality.5 By building up a random-quality improvement Schumpeterian
growth model, they investigated the monetary effect on innovation and income inequality and
found an inverted-U effect in a general case with positive entry cost. While they focus exclu-
sively on wealth heterogeneity in explaining the nexus of inflation and income inequality, the
heterogeneity of human capital is omitted. The present study thus complements their paper
by incorporating human capital heterogeneity, which enables us to generate mixed results that
reconcile with the empirical inconsistency.
The rest of this study proceeds as follows. The basic model is spelled out in Section 2. Section
3 solves the model and explores the growth effects of monetary policy. Section 4 characterizes the
5Zheng (2020) and Zheng, Mishra and Yang (2020) also asked a similar question of how inflation affects income
inequality in a Schumpeterian and variety-expansion growth model, respectively, in which firms suffer from costly
pricing adjustment. However, both studies does not consider the human capital inequality. More importantly, both
studies shows that inflation affects linearly income inequality, which fails to account for the diverse empirical findings
on inflation and income inequality.
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human capital and wealth distribution, and Section 5 investigates the effect of monetary policy
on income inequality. Section 6 provides numerical analysis and the final section concludes.
2 The model
We construct a monetary Schumpeterian growth model based on Grossman and Helpman
(1991) that features endogenous human capital accumulation and heterogeneous households. We
introduce money demand via a CIA constraint on R&D as in Chu and Cozzi (2014). Moreover,
we model household heterogeneity by assuming that households have different levels of wealth
endowments (including financial assets and cash holdings) and human capital endowments, in
order to generate an endogenous income distribution.
2.1 Households
The economy is populated by a unit continuum of households indexed by s ∈ [0, 1]. House-
holds share the same preferences over consumption ct(s) and leisure qt(s) but differ in wealth
and human capital. The lifetime utility function for each household s is given by
U(s) =
∫
∞
0
e−ρt [ln ct(s) + φ ln qt(s)] dt, (1)
where ρ > 0 represents the discount rate, and φ > 0 determines the intensity of the leisure
preference relative to consumption. The budget constraint of each household s (expressed in
units of final goods) is given by
a˙t(s) + m˙t(s) = rtat(s) + wl,tlt(s) + wh,tht(s)− πtmt(s) + itbt(s) + τt − ct(s), (2)
where at(s) is the real value of financial assets, and rt is the real interest rate. Each household
provides raw labor lt(s) and earns the real wage rate wl,t. ht(s) is human capital supplied for
production and R&D, where the wage rate is wh,t. mt(s) is the real value of cash holdings by
household s and πt is the inflation rate reflecting the cost of holding money. bt(s) is the amount
of cash borrowed from household s by entrepreneurs for R&D, and it is the nominal interest
rate. τt is the amount of lump-sum transfer that each household receives identically from the
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government. Therefore, the CIA constraint faced by each household is given by6
bt(s) ≤ mt(s). (3)
At any point in time t, household s owns an amount of human capital stock denoted by ht(s).
We follow Chu, Cozzi and Liao (2013) to assume that households combine their remaining time
endowment 1− qt(s) with their human capital ht(s) for work lt(s) and education et(s) subject to
ht(s) [1− qt(s)] = lt(s) + et(s). (4)
The law of motion of human capital stock for each household is
h˙t(s) = γet(s), (5)
where γ > 0 is a productivity parameter. The optimization problem is to maximize the dis-
counted lifetime utility in (1) subject to the budget constraint (2) and the CIA constraint, together
with the time allocation constraint (4) and the human capital accumulation technology (5). Solv-
ing this problem gives rise to the optimal condition for labor supply7
wl,tqt(s)ht(s) = φct(s), (6)
and the familiar Euler equation
c˙t(s)
ct(s)
= rt − ρ. (7)
We see from (7) that all households have the same growth rate of real consumption such that
c˙t(s)/ct(s) = c˙t/ct, where ct ≡
∫ 1
0 ct(s)ds is the aggregate consumption by all households. More-
over, using the optimality condition for real money balance mt(s) and bt(s), the no-arbitrage
condition between financial assets and money is given by it = rt + πt, which is the Fisher equa-
tion. Finally, we derive the following equilibrium condition that equates the returns on assets
and human capital such that
rt = γ
wh,t
wl,t
+
w˙l,t
wl,t
+
γ[lt(s) + et(s)]
ht(s)
. (8)
6In addition to capturing the empirical evidence of R&D-cash flow sensitivity, households’ financial motives for
money holding also include the following reason. In an economy where the money demand is modeled via a CIA
constraint on consumption, the distribution of consumption expenditure across households is identical to that of
money holdings. This contradicts with the empirical facts documented by Ragot (2014) who found that the distribution
of money (M1) across households in Italy and U.S. is more similar to the distribution of financial assets than to that
of consumption expenditure.
7Detailed derivations are available in Appendix A.1.
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2.2 Final goods
Final goods are used for consumption and produced by a mass of identical perfectly com-
petitive firms using intermediate goods as the only production factor. The production function
adopts a standard Cobb-Douglas form given by
yt = exp
(∫ 1
0
ln xt(j)dj
)
, (9)
where xt(j) denotes the intermediate good j ∈ [0, 1]. From profit maximization, we obtain the
conditional demand function for xt(j) such that
xt(j) = yt/pt(j), (10)
where pt(j) is the price of xt(j).
2.3 Intermediate goods
The differentiated intermediate goods in each industry j is produced by a monopolistic leader
who holds a patent on the latest innovation. The leader’s products would not be replaced until a
new entrant who has a more advanced innovation comes into the market. The production factors
for intermediate goods are raw labor lt and human capital hx,t, with the subscript x specifying
the human capital devoted to the production sector. The production technology for the current
leaders in industry j is
xt(j) = z
nt(j) [hx,t(j)]
α [lt(j)]
1−α , (11)
where the parameter z > 1 measures the step size of each quality improvement, and nt(j) denotes
the number of innovations between time 0 and t. The marginal cost of production for the current
leader in industry j is therefore given by
MCt(j) =
1
znt(j)
[
wh,t(j)
α
]α [wl,t(j)
1− α
]1−α
. (12)
In each industry of differentiated intermediate goods, the current and previous leaders engage
in Bertrand competition. Following Grossman and Helpman (1991), we assume that the markup,
which determines the price charged by the current monopolist over the marginal cost, equals to
the step size z. Therefore, the amount of monopolistic profit is
Πt(j) =
(
z− 1
z
)
yt, (13)
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where we have used (10). Finally, production factor expenditures for hx,t(j) and lt(j) are given by
wh,thx,t(j) =
αyt
z
, (14)
wl,tlt(j) =
(1− α)yt
z
. (15)
2.4 Innovations and R&D
The net present value of a monopolist owning the top-to-line technology in the industry j is
denoted as vt(j). Equation (13) implies a symmetric equilibrium that Πt(j) = Πt and vt(j) = vt.8
Denote by λt the aggregate-level Poisson arrival rate of innovations, the familiar no-arbitrage
condition for the asset value vt is then given by
rtvt = Πt + v˙t − λtvt (16)
In equilibrium, the return on the asset rtvt equals to the sum of flow profits Πt, the capital gain
v˙t, and the potential losses λtvt when an entrant succeeds in innovation and thereby replaces the
current leader.
There is a unit continuum of R&D firms indexed by k ∈ [0, 1] that employ human capital
hr,t(k) for innovation. To capture firms’ cash requirement on innovative activity, we follow the
existing literature such as Chu and Cozzi (2014) and Zheng, Huang and Yang (2019) to assume
that each entrepreneur borrows the amount bt(k) of money from the households such that bt(k) =
wh,thr,t(k). The total amount of money required to finance entrepreneurs’ innovative activities is
bt =
∫ 1
0 bt(k)dk. Each household lends the amount bt(s) = θb,t(s)bt of cash to the innovating
firms, where θb,t(s) ≡ bt(s)/bt denotes the share of bonds owned by household s. The free-entry
in R&D sector determines the zero-expected-profit condition for firm k such that
vtλt(k) = (1+ it)wh,thr,t(k). (17)
In addition, we follow Chu, Cozzi and Liao (2013) and Chu, Ning and Zhu (2019b) to assume
that the firm-level arrival rate per unit of time is λt(k) = ϕhr,t(k)/ht. The aggregate arrival rate of
innovation is therefore given by
λt =
∫ 1
0
λt(k)dk =
ϕhr,t
ht
= ϕΓt, (18)
where hr,t =
∫ 1
0 hr,t(k)dk is the aggregate human capital demand in the R&D sector, and Γt =
hr,t/ht denotes the fraction of human capital devoted to R&D sector with respect to the total
8See Cozzi, Giordani and Zamparelli (2007) for the justification for a symmetric equilibrium in this type of Schum-
peterian growth model.
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human capital stock. The assumption is consistent with the empirical findings in Laincz and
Peretto (2006) that it is the fraction of resources devoted to R&D sector that determines the
aggregate level of the arrival rate of innovation rather than the absolute level of aggregate input.
Thus 1− Γt = hx,t/ht is the fraction of human capital devoted to manufacturing, where hx,t =∫ 1
0 hx,t(j)dj is the aggregate human capital devoted to manufacturing production.
2.5 Monetary authority
Denote the nominal money supply and its growth rate by Mt and ǫt, respectively. The real
money balance is given by mt = Mt/pyt, where pyt is the price of final goods. Taking the log
derivative of mt = Mt/pyt with respect to time yields πt = ǫt − m˙t/mt, where πt ≡ p˙yt/pyt
is the inflation rate as previously defined. We assume that the monetary policy instrument is
the growth rate of money supply ǫt, which is exogenously set by the monetary authority. It
follows that the inflation rate πt is endogenously determined according to the Fisher equation.
Substituting the above expression into Fisher equation (i.e., it = πt + rt) and using the fact that
m˙t/mt = y˙t/yt holds at all times (see equation (25) in the following section for the proof) yields
a one-to-one relationship between the nominal interest rate and the nominal money supply, such
that
it = ǫt + ρ. (19)
This result implies that it is effectively equivalent to ǫt, a policy instrument chosen by the mon-
etary authority. Therefore, for analytical convenience, we will use it to represent the exogenous
policy instrument throughout the rest of this study. Furthermore, we assume the government
runs a balanced budget τt =
∫ 1
0 m˙t(s)ds+
∫ 1
0 πtmt(s)ds by collecting the aggregate seigniorage
revenue
∫ 1
0 m˙t(s)ds +
∫ 1
0 πtmt(s)ds and fully rebating it back to each household in a uniform
lump-sum fashion.
3 Equilibrium allocations and the growth effect of monetary policy
This section first characterizes the decentralized equilibrium, then shows that the economy
exhibits a unique and stable balanced growth path (BGP) equilibrium, and finally explores the
impacts of monetary policy on economic growth.
The decentralized equilibrium in the economy is defined as follows.
Definition 1. A competitive equilibrium is a set of sequences of prices [pt(j),wl,t,wh,t, rt, vt], and a set
of sequences of allocations [ct(s), at(s), bt(s),mt(s), ht(s), et(s), lt(s), yt, xt(j), lt(j), hx,t(j), hr,t(k)] given
the monetary policy [it] such that (i) heterogeneous households s ∈ [0, 1] maximize their utility; (ii) all
competitive final-goods firms, monopolistic leaders, and competitive R&D firms maximize their profits;
(iii) the R&D entrepreneurs finance their wage payments through borrowing such that
∫ 1
0 bt(s)ds = bt =
9
wh,thr,t; (iv) final goods market clears:
∫ 1
0 ct(s)ds = ct = yt; (v) raw labor market clears:
∫ 1
0 lt(s)ds =
lt =
∫ 1
0 lt(j)dj; (vi) human capital market clears:
∫ 1
0 ht(s)ds = ht = hr,t + hx,t; and (vii) asset market
clears:
∫ 1
0 at(s)ds = at = vt.
Next, we proceed to solve for the BGP equilibrium. Prior to that, we first establish the
following lemma:
Lemma 1. Holding a constant nominal interest rate i, the economy jumps to a unique steady state where
Γt = Γ (the share of human capital for R&D to total human capital stock), lt/ht = l/h (the ratio of raw
labor to human capital) and et/ht = e/h (the ratio of education to human capital) are stationary over time.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
To derive the BGP, we first substitute (11) into (10) to yield the aggregate production function
given by
yt = Zt(1− Γt)
αhαt l
1−α
t , (20)
where Zt is the aggregate technology defined as
Zt = exp
(∫ 1
0
nt(j)dj ln z
)
= exp
(∫ t
0
λνdν ln z
)
. (21)
The second equality of (21) is obtained by applying the law of large numbers. We further take log
derivative of (20) and use the result of stationary Γ and together with the fact that l˙t/lt = h˙t/ht
in Lemma 1 to obtain the output growth rate denoted by gy,t,
gy,t ≡ y˙t/yt = gz,t + gh,t, (22)
where gz,t ≡ Z˙t/Zt and gh,t ≡ h˙t/ht, which are stationary on the BGP. It is explicit that the
economy exhibits a two-engine growth: one is driven by R&D and the other by human capital
accumulation. To obtain gz and gh, we further differentiate the log of (21) with respect to t and
get the steady state technology growth rate such that
gz ≡
Z˙t
Zt
= λ ln z = ϕΓ ln z. (23)
By plugging both gz and et/ht from (5) into (22) and using the steady state values of Γ and e/h
from Lemma 1, we obtain the balanced growth rate of output gy such that
gy = ϕΓ ln z+ γ(e/h). (24)
Equation (24) shows that the steady state growth of output depends on Γ, the fraction of total
human capital devoted to R&D, and the fraction of time devoted to education rather than to
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work e/h. To understand the effect of monetary policy on output growth, we investigate how
monetary policy influences Γ and e/h in the following analysis.
Moreover, we use the conditions from equations (3), (14), (17), the stationary Γ, and final-
goods and asset market clearing conditions to obtain the balanced growth path as shown below
such that the equality holds at all times according to Lemma 1:
gy = ga = gb = gm = gc, (25)
where ga, gb, gm and gc are the balanced growth of at, bt, mt and ct, respectively.
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3.1 Equilibrium Allocations and Growth Effect
In this section, we investigate the effect of monetary policy (nominal interest rate targeting)
on the determinants of R&D growth, Γ and human capital growth, e/h. To derive Γ, we first
substitute Euler equation (7) into (16), using the balanced growth conditions gy = gv and (18) to
obtain vt = Πt/(ρ+ ϕΓ). We then substitute this expression and (13) into the left-hand-side of
R&D free-entry condition (17), and replace wh,thr,t(k) in the right-hand-side of (17) with equation
(14) expressed as a function of Γ, such that
(z− 1)λ
(ρ+ λ)(1+ i)
=
αΓ
1− Γ
⇔ Γ =
(z− 1)ϕ− αρ(1+ i)
(z− 1)ϕ+ ϕα(1+ i)
. (26)
It is easy to verify that Γ is decreasing in i. The intuition is straightforward. A higher nominal
interest rate i increases the borrowing cost for firms to engage in R&D activities relative to
manufacturing, the skilled labor is henceforth reallocated from R&D sector to manufacturing
sector, resulting in a smaller fraction of human capital utilized in R&D sector and a diminish
in the technology growth according to (23). In addition, by applying the BGP conditions, we
eventually have10
wh
wl
=
αρ
γ[α+ (1− α)(1− Γ)]
, (27)
l
h
=
ρ(1− α)(1− Γ)
γ[α+ (1− α)(1− Γ)]
, (28)
e
h
= 1−
ρ(1− Γ)[φz+ (1− α)]
γ[α+ (1− α)(1− Γ)]
. (29)
From the above expressions, we find that a rise in nominal interest rate i raises l/h, but de-
crease wh/wl and e/h. The intuition behind is that a higher nominal nominal interest rate i,
as illustrated above, reallocates high-skilled labor from R&D sector to the manufacturing sector,
which increases the marginal product of low-skilled labor as shown in (11). Consequently, it
9See Appendix A.2 for the proof.
10See Appendix A.2 for the derivations.
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increases the relative demand for low-skilled labor and thus results in higher employment of the
low-skilled relative to the high-skilled labor l/h. The increase in the relative demand for low-
skilled labor pushes down the relative wage of the high-skilled to the low-skilled labor wh/wl .
Henceforth, a diminish in wage gap between the higher and lower-skilled labors discourages the
investment on education, leading to a smaller e/h and lower human capital growth as shown in
(5).
By plugging (28) and (29) into expression (11), we can easily verify that the economic growth
rate gy is unambiguously decreasing in i. Accordingly, we establish the following proposition:
Proposition 1. The growth rates of the aggregate technology, aggregate human capital, and aggregate
economy are all decreasing in the nominal interest rate.
Proof. Proven in the text.
This result is standard and consistent with the theoretical predictions in Chu and Cozzi (2014),
Huang, Yang and Cheng (2017) and Chu, Ning and Zhu (2019b), and also agrees with empirical
studies such as Vaona (2012) and Barro (2013).
4 Human capital and wealth distribution
In this section, we discuss the properties of the distribution of human capital and wealth
(including the financial assets and bonds issued by firms) and the effects of monetary policy
(nominal interest rate targeting) on them.
4.1 Human capital distribution
We denote θh,t(s) ≡ ht(s)/ht the relative stock of human capital for household s at time t
where θh,0(s) ≡ h0(s)/h0 is exogenously given at time 0. The following lemma pertaining to the
distribution of human capital greatly simplifies our analysis for income inequality in the next
section:
Lemma 2. For each household s, the share of human capital stock is constant over time and exogenously
determined at time 0 such that θh,t(s) = θh,0(s).
Proof. Proven in Appendix A.3.
In the economy, since all households are competitive in both skilled and unskilled labor
markets, thus a change in the nominal interest rate that affects the skilled/unskilled wage rate
generates a homogeneous effect on households’ choices between accumulating human capital
and providing raw labor. Moreover, the identical human capital accumulation productivity γ and
depreciating rate δ across households jointly determine that all households accumulate human
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capital at the same rate. It further implies that the relative share of human capital for each
household is invariant over time and equals to its initial steady state value. This result also
means that the distribution of human capital is neutral to the monetary policy.
4.2 Wealth distribution
Define dt(s) ≡ at(s) + bt(s) and dt ≡ at + bt as household s’ (tangible) wealth and aggregate
wealth at time t, respectively. We further define θd,t(s) ≡ dt(s)/dt as the relative wealth of
household s at time t where θd,0(s) ≡ d0(s)/d0 is exogenously given at time 0. We then obtain a
convenient property of the distribution of wealth similar to the human capital distribution in the
following lemma:
Lemma 3. For each household s, its asset share is constant over time and exogenously determined at time
0 such that θd,t(s) = θd,0(s) for all t.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
This property is similar to García-Peñalosa and Turnovsky (2006, 2007) and Chu and Cozzi
(2018). It implies that the distribution of wealth is neutral to the monetary policy. According to
Lemma 2 and 3, the initial human capital distribution and the wealth distribution do not change
over time in equilibrium. Therefore, the human capital distribution is determined by the initial
endowment of human capital stock, and the wealth distribution is pinned down by the initial
financial asset holdings and cash holdings in the economy. However, as we will show in the next
section, monetary policy affects the relative share of the two heterogeneities, causing the income
distribution to be endogenously determined.
5 Monetary Policy and Income Inequality
In this section, we first derive the income distribution and then analyze the effect of monetary
policy on income inequality.
5.1 Income Distribution
The amount of before-transfer income earned by each household s is the sum of the wealth
income and wage income such that It(s) = rtdt(s) + wl,tlt(s) + wh,tht(s). The average income of
all households is therefore given by It = rtdt+wl,tlt+wh,tht. Combining both equations, together
with (28), (27) and (29), yields the share of income earned by each household s
θI,t(s) ≡
It(s)
It
=
rtθd,t(s) + Ψtθh,t(s)
rt + Ψt
, (30)
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where Ψt ≡ (wl,tlt + wh,tht)/dt is the ratio of wage income to total wealth. It can be rewritten as
Ψt = (wl,tlt/wh,tht + 1) · (wh,tht/dt), (31)
where
wl,tlt
wh,tht
=
(1− α)(1− Γ)
α
,
from (27), and
wh,tht
dt
=
wh,tht
at + bt
=
ϕ
1+ i+ Γϕ
,
is derived by combining wh,tht/at = ϕ/(1+ i) from (17), with (18) and bt = wh,thtΓ from the bond
market-clearing condition. Moreover, recall from the Euler equation r = ρ+ gy, by substituting
the above results into (30), we can show that the distribution of income at time t has a mean of
one and the following variance
σ2I,t = σ
2
I =
(
ρ+ gy
ρ+ gy + Ψ
)2
σ2d +
(
Ψ
ρ+ gy + Ψ
)2
σ2h , (32)
where we assume a zero covariance (correlation) σd,h = 0 as the benchmark and discuss the case
of non-zero covariance in the quantitative part.
Equation (32) shows that the income inequality (measured in variance) σ2I can be decomposed
into the variance of total wealth σ2d and of human capital σ
2
h , multiplied by their individual weight
(the square of interest income share
[
(ρ+ gy)/(ρ+ gy + Ψ)
]2
and the square of wage income
share
[
Ψ/(ρ+ gy + Ψ)
]2
, respectively). Lemma 2 and 3 have shown that the distributions of
human capital and wealth are invariant, and are neutral to the change of nominal interest rate.
Thus, the impact of i on σ2I can be boiled down to the impact of i on the relative interest-wage
income share (ρ+ gy)/Ψ. Recall that Proposition 1 has shown that economic growth is decreasing
in i. It follows immediately that (ρ+ gy) (which is r, according to equation (7)) is monotonically
decreasing in i. This real-interest-rate effect, as identified by Chu and Cozzi (2018), results in
more interest income (including asset income and bond income) losses to the rich than to the
poor, and thus reduces the relative interest-wage income share (ρ+ gy)/Ψ.
We now proceed to investigate the impact of i on the ratio of wage income to wealth Ψ. For
ease of illustration, we decompose Ψ into two parts: the wage income ratio of the unskilled to
skilled labor wl,tlt/wh,tht and the ratio of skilled wage income to wealth wh,tht/(at + bt) (from
(31)). There are three channels through which i may affect Ψ. First, a rise in i increases the
unskilled-skilled employment ratio l/h and also the wage ratio wl/wh between the two groups
(from (28) and (27)), leading to an unambiguous rise in their product wl,tlt/wh,tht and in turn Ψ.
Second, increasing i would reduce the fraction of skilled labor devoted into R&D and thus the
amount of money (bonds) bt needed for R&D activity, which tends to increase wh,tht/(at + bt)
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and Ψ. Third, a higher i would also increase the asset value a by increasing the unit cost of R&D
(1+ i) via free entry condition, resulting in a lower wh,tht/(at + bt) and Ψ. The overall effect of
i on Ψ is ambiguous and contingent on the parameter values (see Proposition 2 below for more
detailed discussion and the proof is relegated to Appendix A.5).
Finally, given the relative dispersions of wealth and human capital, we are now able to inves-
tigate the monetary effect of i on income inequality. Our results are summarized in the following
proposition.
Proposition 2. Following an increase in the nominal interest rate i from i = i0 for all i in the reasonable
range [0, iˆ]:11
1. income inequality σ2I will increase for all level of i > i0 = 0 if (i) the relative variance of human
capital distribution to wealth distribution is greater (lower) than the relative interest-wage income
share at i = i0, i.e., σ2h/σ
2
d > (<)[(ρ + gy)/Ψ]|i=i0 ; and (ii) this relative share is decreasing
(increasing) in i, i.e., d[(ρ+ gy)/Ψ]/di < (>)0;
2. σ2I is a monotonically decreasing or U-shaped function of i if (i) σ
2
h/σ
2
d < (>)(ρ+ gy)/Ψ, and (ii)
d[(ρ+ gy)/Ψ]/di < (>)0.
Proof. See Appendix A.5.
To understand Proposition 2, we start with the driving forces for (ρ + gy)/Ψ. Recall that
r = ρ + gy, a rise in i increases inflation and hence the opportunity cost of engaging in R&D,
and thus decreases the return to R&D activities r by reducing gy. This negative real-interest-
rate effect directly contributes to a decline in the relative interest-wage income share (ρ+ gy)/Ψ.
However, a higher i may either increase or decrease the wage income-to-wealth ratio Ψ through
the aforementioned three channels. If a higher i increases Ψ, it decreases (ρ+ gy)/Ψ. If a rise in
i reduces Ψ, but at a lower rate than the decrease of gy, the overall effect on (ρ+ gy)/Ψ remains
decreasing in i. By contrast, if i decreases Ψ at a higher rate than the decrease of gy, the overall
effect on (ρ+ gy)/Ψ can be increasing in i.
We then turn to discuss the results in the two arguments of Proposition 2. Suppose that
(ρ+ gy)/Ψ is decreasing in i, an increase in i unambiguously increases the wage income share
Ψ/(ρ+ gy + Ψ) (the weight on σ2h ) but decreases the interest income share (ρ+ gy)/(ρ+ gy + Ψ)
(the weight on σ2d ) according to equation (32). We assume that the initial steady state of the
economy i0 is endowed with a sufficiently high dispersion of human capital, i.e., σ
2
h/σ
2
d > (ρ+
gy)/Ψ. Since (ρ + gy)/Ψ is decreasing in i, the condition σ2h/σ
2
d > (ρ + gy)/Ψ never switches
sign within the range [0, iˆ]. As i increases, an increasing share of a larger dispersion σ2h and a
decreasing share of a lower dispersion σ2d jointly induces an amplification of income inequality.
11The upper bound of the nominal interest rate iˆ ensures that Γ ≥ 0 (the fraction of total human capital devoted to
R&D), see Appendix A.5 for more details.
15
By contrast, suppose that (ρ + gy)/Ψ is increasing in i, in this case, increasing i, instead,
decreases the wage income share Ψ/(ρ+ gy + Ψ) while increases its counterpart (ρ+ gy)/(ρ+
gy+Ψ). Assume now that the initial steady state of the economy i0 is endowed with a sufficiently
low dispersion of human capital, i.e., σ2h/σ
2
d < (ρ+ gy)/Ψ. Since (ρ+ gy)/Ψ is increasing in i,
the condition σ2h/σ
2
d < (ρ+ gy)/Ψ never switches sign within the range [0, iˆ]. As i increases, a
decreasing share of a lower dispersion σ2h along with an increasing share of a larger σ
2
d again
induces an exacerbation of income inequality. The above two cases illustrate the first argument
of Proposition (2) with σI being monotonically increasing in i.
More interesting scenarios would emerge when we switch the sign of the endowment condi-
tion in (i) to become σ2h/σ
2
d > (<)[(ρ+ gy)/Ψ]|i=i0 as shown in the second argument of Propo-
sition 2 while holding everything else the same as the above analysis. Either a monotonically
decreasing or a U-shaped relationship between σI and i could arise, depending on the feasible
range of nominal interest rate [0, iˆ].
In particular, along with (ρ+ gy)/Ψ being decreasing in i, if the economy is initially endowed
with a sufficiently low dispersion of human capital, i.e., σ2h/σ
2
d < (ρ+ gy)/Ψ, increasing i from
i0 first triggers an increasing share Ψ/(ρ + gy + Ψ) of a lower σ2h and a decreasing share (ρ +
gy)/(ρ+ gy + Ψ) of a larger σ2h , which decreases income inequality σI . However, as i continues
to increase, it may reach a threshold i∗ such that the sign of the above condition will reverse to
become σ2h/σ
2
d > (ρ+ gy)/Ψ. From then on, increasing i from i
∗ increases income inequality just
as the case depicted in the first argument. If i never reaches the threshold i∗ in its feasible range
[0, iˆ], then σ2h/σ
2
d < (ρ+ gy)/Ψ remains, which ensures a decreasing relationship between σI and
i. While if i is able to exceed the threshold i∗ thorough the range [0, iˆ], an interesting U-shaped
relationship between σI and i will arise.
On the contrary, along with (ρ+ gy)/Ψ being increasing in i, if the economy is endowed with
a sufficiently high dispersion of human capital, i.e., σ2h/σ
2
d > (ρ+ gy)/Ψ, raising i from i0 triggers
a decrease (an increase) in wage income (interest income) share of a higher σ2h (lower σ
2
d ), leading
to a reduction in σI . Once i crosses the threshold i
∗ from below, i becomes positively related to σI .
Again, if i never reaches the threshold i∗ within the feasible range [0, iˆ], this leads to a decreasing
relationship.
Our finding of a monotone relationship in the first argument of Proposition 2 is consistent
with Jin (2009), whose result depends solely on the relative dispersions of capital and skill.
Our major finding about a U-shape result is also found in Chu, Cozzi, Fan, Furukawa and
Liao (2019a) where a U-shaped result holds under a more restricted assumption with zero entry
cost. Our quantitative analysis will show that a U-shaped relationship is likely to occur in a
reasonable range of parameter configuration and more importantly, it is supported by recent
empirical findings.
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6 Quantitative analysis
In this section, we calibrate the model to match the empirical moments in the U.S. economy
and numerically evaluate the effects of nominal interest rate on economic growth and income
inequality. Towards that end we first assign steady state values to the following structural pa-
rameters {ρ, z, α,γ, ϕ, φ}.
We set the discount rate ρ to a conventional value 0.04 as in Chu, Cozzi and Liao (2013)
and Chu, Cozzi, Furukawa and Liao (2017). We then calibrate the step size of innovation z
by considering an innovation arrival rate of λ = 4.4% which lies in an intermediate range of
estimation,12 and total factor productivity (TFP) growth rate 0.5% for the U.S. economy from
1990-2016 according to the Conference Board Total Economy Database. As for the factor intensity
of human capital to output α, we set it to a conventional value of 0.33 as in Mankiw, Romer and
Weil (1992) and Chu, Ning and Zhu (2019b). Next, we pin down the R&D productivity ϕ by the
expression of technological growth from (23), and matching it to the TFP growth 0.5%. We then
fit the rest of the parameter values by using the long-run average market nominal interest rate i
up to 8%, and the above calibrated parameters to obtain a value of 0.3 for ϕ.
In addition, we jointly calibrate the human capital productivity γ and the leisure preference
parameter φ. First, the growth rate of human capital is obtained by taking the difference between
the average U.S. long-run economic growth rate 2% and the technological growth rate 0.5%
using equation (24), which is 1.5%. We further match it to (4) and yield the first equation for
our calibration. Next, we substitute the standard moment of working time q = 2/3 into (4) and
replace the ratio of unskilled to skilled labor l/h and the ratio of education to human capital
e/h with their steady state expressions from (28) and (29), respectively, and obtain our second
equation for calibration. Using the two equations alongside the R&D intensity among skilled
labor Γ from (26) jointly determine the values of γ and φ which are 0.12 and 1.93,13 respectively.
Finally, for the measures of inequality indicators σa and σh, we use the standard deviations.
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We find standard deviations of the U.S. income and wealth in a sample from the National Lon-
gitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) data covering the period 1994-2012 (Maroto, 2017).15 We first
12Various studies have considered different values for the arrival rate of innovations. Lanjouw (1998) reported the
probability of obsolescence to be situated within 7% to 12% and Chu and Cozzi (2018) considered a calibrated value
of 12.5%. Acemoglu and Akcigit (2012) considered a relatively high value of 33%. Whereas Caballero and Jaffe (2002)
and Laitner and Stolyarov (2013) documented a mean rate of creative destruction around 4% and 3.5%, respectively.
Here, we set an intermediate value of 4.4% which is within the above range of estimations.
13Our calibrated value for φ is well consistent with many findings in the literature. Azariadis, Chen, Lu and Wang
(2013) reported a leisure preference around 1.4, Chu and Cozzi (2014)’s finding varied in the range [2.17, 2.22] and
Cazzavillan and Olszewski (2011)’s calibration showed a value of 2.13.
14We do not report the Gini coefficient because the expression for income inequality in equation (32) would involve
the procedure for Gini coefficient decomposition from income sources. The decomposition method has been studied
extensively in the literature and is rather nontrivial. Most importantly, we lack critical data information available
for decomposition. One example is the lack of “rank correlation” data for constructing Pseudo Gini coefficient. See
Shorrocks (1982) and Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985) for an in-depth analysis.
15Maroto (2017) used NLSY79 cohort, a stratified sample of 12686 respondents between 14 and 22 years old when
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calibrate the standard deviation of human capital by inserting the standard deviation values
based on NLSY data into equation (32). We then follow Turnovsky and García-Peñalosa (2008)
to normalize the standard deviation of wealth σd to 1 and express σh as 0.293 for our benchmark
case. Table 1 summarizes our benchmark parameter values.
Table 1: Parameter values and targeted moments
Targeted moments
λ q gz g
4.4% 2/3 0.5% 2%
Parameters
ρ z α ϕ γ φ
0.04 1.12 0.33 0.3 0.12 1.93
6.1 Inflation and growth
Figure 1 displays the quantitative relationship between nominal interest rate and economic
growth, starting from the benchmark case with 2% economic growth rate and 8% nominal interest
rate using the U.S. data. We find that there is a negative relationship between growth and
nominal interest rate in a fairly large range of i from 0 to 50% (i.e., corresponding to π in the
range [−6%, 44%]). An increase in the nominal interest rate decreases economic growth rate,
which confirms our model prediction in Proposition 1.
As pointed above, our model features a two-engine growth. A higher nominal interest rate
i increases the firms’ borrowing cost for R&D activities, and in turn deters technology growth;
while at the same time, a shift of skill labor to the manufacturing sector increases the marginal
product of low-skilled labor, which reduces the wage gap between skilled and unskilled labor,
discouraging education and thus the human capital growth. The model prediction is in line with
several theoretical findings such as Chu and Cozzi (2014), Huang, Yang and Cheng (2017) and
Chu, Ning and Zhu (2019b).
6.2 Inflation and inequality (benchmark U.S. economy)
Figure 2a-2c plot relationships between inflation and inequality under various dispersion
ratios of human capital and wealth, with the nominal interest rate varying within the reasonable
range from 0 and 0.5.
Figure 2a presents our benchmark result with σh = 0.293 and shows that the relationship
between inflation and income inequality follows a non-monotonic U-shape. It is explicit that
the income inequality σI decreases in nominal interest rate i for a lower level of i and starts to
first surveyed in 1979, and relied on seven survey waves in years from 1994 till 2012. A total of 4761 individuals were
included in his sample.
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Figure 1: Growth rate and nominal interest rate.
increase in it at a higher level of i. This U-shape result is consistent with the more recent empirical
estimates using non-linear regressions with U.S. data (see for example Galli and van der Hoeven
(2001) and Balcilar, Chang, Gupta and Miller (2018)). Moreover, our threshold inflation rate of 6%
(i.e., corresponds to a threshold nominal interest rate around i = 0.12) also coincides the range
of the estimates between 5% and 6% found in Bulírˇ (2001), Galli and van der Hoeven (2001), and
Balcilar, Chang, Gupta and Miller (2018).
It is worth noting that the majority of earlier empirical studies regarding developed coun-
tries find negative relationships between inflation and income inequality (whereas the U-shaped
pattern was found to appear in the U.S. after 1995, according to Monnin (2014)).16 We therefore
adjust σh from our benchmark 0.293 up to 0.44 by calibrating it to match a sample of historical
data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) as in Shea (1995), covering 1981-1987.
Interestingly, Figure 2b shows that the previously shown U-shape result is replaced by a mono-
tonically negative relationship, which is well in line with the earlier empirical findings for the
U.S. case. Moreover, for purpose of comparison, we also adjust σ2h from our benchmark 0.293
down to 0.161 using more recent survey data collected in 2013 according to Rauscher (2016).17
Figure 2c shows that the inequality and inflation are positively related.
The main cause for the above results that display various patterns subject to different peri-
ods is mainly attributed to the pattern of human capital heterogeneity across time. Empirical
evidence generally suggests that inequality in human capital continues to decline over time in
the U.S. (see for example Ziesemer (2016) who covered a time period of 1950-2010). This de-
16Most of the studies on the inequality-inflation linkage in developed countries point out negative relationships
between the two, with a few exceptions of positive relationships, though they are not robust. See Galli and van der
Hoeven (2001) and Monnin (2014).
17Rauscher (2016) used the Rosters and Transfers Module of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics which provided
transfer information between parents and adult children from a total of 9107 families who took part in the 2013 survey.
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clining trend is consistent with the three standard deviations we used for different time periods.
The earlier period (1981 to 1987) is characterized by a higher value of σh as shown in Figure 2b,
corresponding to the scenario where the relative variance of human capital to wealth is larger
than the relative interest-wage income share (i.e., σ2h/σ
2
d > (ρ+ gy)/Ψ). Together with the rel-
ative share being increasing in i, a negative relationship between σI and inflation appears for
a plausible range of i before crossing the threshold i˜. Next, our benchmark period (1994 to
2012) is characterized by a smaller value of σh than the earlier period indicating that although
σ2h/σ
2
d > (ρ+ gy)/Ψ holds at the benchmark i = 0.08, the relative share (ρ+ gy)/Ψ increases in i
and eventually the condition could be reversed to σ2h/σ
2
d < (ρ+ gy)/Ψ as i exceeds the threshold
value i˜ = 0.12, resulting in a U-shaped relationship between σI and inflation. Finally, the most
recent data in 2013 gives the smallest value of σh as shown in Figure 2c, which delivers a positive
relationship between σI and inflation. This result is not surprising provided that the condition
σ2h/σ
2
d < (ρ+ gy)/Ψ being held at the initial level of i, and remains to hold as i increases. All the
above results conform well to the two arguments in Proposition 2.
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Figure 2: Income inequality and nominal interest rate: (a) σh/σd = 0.293; (b) σh/σd = 0.44; (c)
σh/σd = 0.161.
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6.3 The correlation (covariance) between wealth and human capital heterogeneities.
In this subsection, we relax our assumption about the independency between wealth and
human capital dispersions by integrating their covariance in our sensitivity analysis.
In an empirical study, Pfeffer (2011) used samples from NLSY and PSID data covering years
around 2005 to 2007, which contain observations from the U.S. families, and reported the corre-
lation coefficient between family wealth and child education attainment, denoted as ρd,h, to be in
the range [0.288, 0.376]. We take as our benchmark the average value (0.33) of a set of correlation
coefficients documented in their study for ρd,h.
18 Figure 3a shows that under a correlation coef-
ficient ρd,h = 0.33, the income inequality and nominal interest rate become positively correlated
for the same set of benchmark parameter values as we used before.
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Figure 3: Income inequality and nominal interest rate with non-zero covariance: (a) ρd,h = 0.33;
(b) ρd,h = 0.01; (c) ρd,h = −0.1.
In Figure 3b, by lowering ρd,h to 0.01, we observe the emergence of a U-shaped relationship,
while the threshold value of inflation lying at a negative level around −1% (with i = 5%). Finally,
we examine a negative correlation at ρd,h = −0.1, which may appear due to the wealth effect that
children borne to rich families may have less incentive to achieve education attainment.19 Figure
18García-Peñalosa and Turnovsky (2015) also set the correlation between capital and skills endowments to 0.33 in
their numerical analysis.
19García-Peñalosa and Turnovsky (2012) argued the correlation between skill and capital endowments can be both
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3c shows that with ρd,h = −0.1, a U-shaped result maintains but is accompanied by a much
higher threshold level of inflation 74% (nominal interest rate 80%).
7 Conclusion
In this study, we explore the effects of monetary policy on income inequality in a Schumpete-
rian growth model with human capital accumulation where we consider both asset and human
capital heterogeneities. We find that a higher nominal interest rate (inflation) unambiguously
leads to a decrease in economic growth rate whereas its impact on income inequality depends
on the relative dispersions of human capital and wealth and the response of the relative interest-
wage income share to the nominal interest rate. Income inequality may increase (decrease) in
inflation rate when the dispersion of human capital dominates (is dominated by) that of wealth
and the relative interest-wage income share is decreasing in nominal interest rate. We show that
our model can produce a U-shaped relationship between income inequality and inflation which
is consistent with the current empirical findings. Moreover, our quantitative example shows that
this U-shaped relationship occurs in the range of parameter configuration that matches the U.S.
data and the threshold level of inflation which is around 6% is also consistent with the U.S. em-
pirical facts. One future extension can be done by applying a more commonly used and precise
measure of income inequality – the Gini coefficient. With more accurate estimations of the Gini
coefficient decomposition, one can numerically evaluate the nexus between inflation and income
inequality measured in the Gini coefficient to check the robustness of the U-shaped relationship.
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Appendix A
A.1 Derivations of the household optimality conditions.
The Hamiltonian equation is given by
H = e−ρt[ln ct(s) + φ ln qt(s)] + ηt(s)[rtat(s) + wl,tlt(s) + wh,tht(s) + itbt(s) + τt(s)− πtmt(s)
− ct(s)] + νt(s) [mt(s)− bt(s)] +ωt(s)γet(s),
(A.1)
Then the first-order conditions for ct(s), lt(s), et(s), bt(s), at(s), mt(s), and ht(s) are respectively given by
e−ρt
ct(s)
= ηt(s), (A.2)
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φe−ρt
qt(s)
1
ht(s)
= ηt(s)wh,t, (A.3)
φe−ρt
qt(s)
1
ht(s)
= ωt(s)γ, (A.4)
ηt(s)it = νt(s), (A.5)
ηt(s)rt + η˙t(s) = 0, (A.6)
− πtηt(s) + νt(s) + η˙t(s) = 0, (A.7)
− ηt(s)wh,t +
φe−ρt
qt(s)
lt(s) + et(s)
[ht(s)]2
+ ω˙t(s) = 0. (A.8)
Substituting (A.5) into (A.3), and then using equation (A.2) is able to obtain (6). Then differentiating (A.2)
with respect to t, and using (A.6) yields the Euler equation (7). In addition, substituting (A.5) into (A.7) to
eliminate νt(s), and further making use of (A.6) yield the Fisher equation such that it = rt + πt. To derive
equation (8), we build up the first equation by dividing (A.3) using (A.4)
ηt(s)
ωt(s)
=
γ
wh,t
. (A.9)
Differentiating (A.9) with respect to t yields
η˙t(s)
ηt(s)
+
w˙l,t
wh,t
=
ω˙t(s)
ωt(s)
. (A.10)
Dividing (A.8) by ωt(s), and thereafter substituting (A.3), (A.6) (A.9), and (A.10) yields (8).
A.2 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof for the stationarity of Γ
Suppose that a time path of [it]∞t=0 is stationary. First, define a transformed variable Φt ≡ yt/vt, and
its law of motion is given by
Φ˙t
Φt
=
y˙t
yt
−
v˙t
vt
. (A.11)
To derive the law of motion for vt, substituting (13) into (16) yields
v˙t
vt
= rt + ϕΓ −
(
z− 1
z
)
Φt. (A.12)
Plugging (7) and (A.12) into (A.11) yields
Φ˙t
Φt
=
(
z− 1
z
)
Φt − ϕΓ − ρ. (A.13)
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We need to derive a relationship between Φt and Γ. Using the human capital income condition (14) and
the zero-expected-profit condition of R&D (15), we yield an expression to relate Γ to Φt
Γ = 1−
α(1+ i)
ϕz
Φt. (A.14)
Substituting (A.14) into (A.13) eventually yields an autonomous dynamical equation for Φt such that
Φ˙t
Φt
=
z− 1+ α(1+ i)
z
Φt − ϕ− ρ. (A.15)
Given that Φt is a control variable and the coefficient on Φt is positive in (A.15), so that the dynamics of
Φt is characterized by saddle-point stability in this model such that Φt jumps immediately to its interior
steady state value given by
Φ =
z(ϕ+ ρ)
z− 1+ α(1+ i)
. (A.16)
Equations (A.14) and (A.16) imply that when Φt is stationary, Γ must be stationary.
Proof of the stationarity of lt/ht and et/ht
Next, we turn to prove lt/ht and et/ht are stationary. Combining (15) with (14) gives rise to the human
capital wage rate relative to raw labor wage rate such that
wh,t
wl,t
=
α
(1− α)(1− Γ)
lt
ht
. (A.17)
Differentiating (15) with respect to t yields the dynamic condition for real wage rate of raw labor such that
w˙l,t
wl,t
=
y˙t
yt
−
l˙t
lt
= rt − ρ−
l˙t
lt
, (A.18)
where we have used the condition ct = yt and the Euler equation (7).
In addition, from (4) and (8), we can infer that the leisure qt(s) is identical across households, which
in turn implies that ct(s)/ht(s) is constant across households according to (6). Thus, households share
the same leisure endowment while they differ in the their allocations of time into receiving education or
working. Making use of this attribute, substituting equations (14) and (A.17) into (6) yields
qt =
φz
1− α
lt
ht
, (A.19)
where qt is either the aggregate leisure endowment or the average leisure endowment given the population
in the economy is a measure of one. Substituting (A.17), (A.18), and (A.19) into (8) yields
ρ =
γα
1− α
1
1− Γ
lt
ht
−
l˙t
lt
+ γ
(
1−
φz
1− α
lt
ht
)
. (A.20)
On the balanced-growth equilibrium, l˙t/lt must be stationary over time. Therefore, given other exogenous
parameters and a constant Γ, lt/ht = l/h must be constant over time as well. As a result, e/h must
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be stationary according to (5), where et ≡
∫ 1
0 et(s)ds is the aggregate raw labor devoted to education.
Therefore, we can derive
l˙t
lt
=
h˙t
ht
= γ
e
h
− δ = γ− δ− γ
[
φz
1− α
+ 1
]
l
h
. (A.21)
Putting (A.21) back into (A.20) gives rise to the following expressions of l/h and e/h on the BGP, respec-
tively,
l
h
=
ρ(1− α)(1− Γ)
γ[α+ (1− α)(1− Γ)]
, (A.22)
and
e
h
= 1−
ρ(1− Γ)[φz+ (1− α)]
γ[α+ (1− α)(1− Γ)]
. (A.23)
Derivation of equation (25)
Given the stationary Γ on the BGP, differentiating the log of (17) with respect to time yields
v˙t
vt
=
w˙h,t
wh,t
+
h˙r,t
hr,t
=
w˙h,t
wh,t
+
h˙x,t
hx,t
=
y˙t
yt
(A.24)
where the first equation applies the condition that λ = ϕΓ is constant over time, and the last equality
applies (14). From the asset market clearing condition, we then have a˙t/at = v˙t/vt = y˙t/yt. The final
goods market clearing condition ct = yt implies that a˙t/at = v˙t/vt = y˙t/yt = c˙t/ct. In equilibrium,
households lend all their money to the entrepreneurs such that bt = mt, which leads to
b˙t
bt
=
m˙t
mt
. (A.25)
Finally, according to the bond market clearing condition bt = wh,thr,t, we have
b˙t
bt
=
w˙h,t
wh,t
+
h˙r,t
hr,t
=
y˙t
yt
. (A.26)
Therefore, we eventually have
y˙t
yt
=
a˙t
at
=
b˙t
bt
=
m˙t
mt
=
c˙t
ct
. (A.27)
A.3 Proof of lemma 2
We assume that the share has a general distribution function fh with a mean of one and a variance of
σ2h . Recall from (8) and (6) that qt(s) should be identical for all households and thereby ct(s)/ht(s) = ct/ht.
In addition, from equation (7), we know that c˙t(s)/ct(s) = c˙t/ct, which in turn implies that the evolution
of human capital for all households obeys the same rule such that h˙t(s)/ht(s) = h˙t/ht. The law of motion
for human capital share is thereafter given by
θ˙h,t(s)
θh,t(s)
=
h˙t(s)
ht(s)
−
h˙t
ht
= 0. (A.28)
Thus the share of human capital for each household is constant over time.
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A.4 Proof of lemma 3
Since household s at any time exhausts all her cash such that bht (s) = m
h
t (s) in equilibrium, thus,
households’ asset-accumulation function in (2) can be rewritten as
a˙t(s) + b˙t(s) = rt[at(s) + bt(s)]− ct(s)
[
1−
1− α
z
−
α
z(1− Γ)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
χ1
+τt, (A.29)
where we have used the condition (6) and (A.17) to express households’ wage income in terms of consump-
tion such that wh,tht(s) + wl,tlt(s) = wh,tht(s)[(1− α)(1− Γ)/α + 1] = {(1− α)/z + α/[z(1− Γ)]}ct(s).
Aggregating (A.29) for all s yields a˙t + b˙t = rt(at + bt)− χ1ct + τt. Thus, the motion θd,t(s) is given by
θ˙d,t(s)
θd,t(s)
=
d˙t(s)
dt(s)
−
d˙t
dt
=
χ1ct − τt
dt
−
χ1ct(s)− τt
dt(s)
⇔ θ˙d,t(s) =
χ1ct − τt
dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
χ2
θd,t(s)−
χ1ctθc,t(s)− τt
dt
, (A.30)
where χ2 = ρ > 0 is obtained by applying the fact that {at, bt, ct, τt} all grow at the same rate g in
equilibrium from Proposition 1 such that
χ2 =
χ1ct − τt
dt
= r−
d˙t
dt
= ρ > 0.
Since θd,t(s) is a state variable and the coefficient of θd,t(s) is positive, the only solution for the one-
dimensional differential equation that describes the potential evolution of θd,t(s) given an initial θd,0(s), as
presented in (A.30), is θ˙d,t(s) = 0 for all t > 0. This can be achieved by letting consumption share θc,t(s)
jump to its steady state value θhc,0(s). Imposing θ˙dt(s) = 0 on (A.30) yields
θc,0(s) = 1−
ρ[1− θd,0(s)]
ct/dt
, (A.31)
where ct/dt can be derived by using at = vt = α(1+ i)ct/[zϕ(1− Γ)] in (14) and (17), and bt = Γwh,tht =
αΓct/[z(1− Γ)] according to (15) and the bond market-clearing condition, that is
ct
dt
=
ct
at + bt
=
zϕ(1− Γ)
α(1+ i) + αΓϕ
. (A.32)
A.5 Proof of Proposition 2
To explore the effect of nominal interest rate i on σ2I , we rewrite equation (32) as
σ2I =
(
1−
Ψ
ρ+ gy + Ψ
)2
σ2d +
(
Ψ
ρ+ gy + Ψ
)2
σ2h ,
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and differentiate σ2I with respect to i yielding
dσ2I
di
= −2
(
1−
Ψ
ρ+ gy + Ψ
)
σ2d ·
d
(
Ψ
ρ+gy+Ψ
)
di
+ 2
(
Ψ
ρ+ gy + Ψ
)
σ2h ·
d
(
Ψ
ρ+gy+Ψ
)
di
=
2Ψ
ρ+ gy + Ψ
·
d
(
Ψ
ρ+gy+Ψ
)
di
·
{
σ2h −
(
ρ+ gy
Ψ
)
σ2d
}
,
(A.33)
where
d
(
Ψ
ρ+gy+Ψ
)
di
=
dΨ/di
ρ+ gy + Ψ
−
Ψ ·
(
dgy/di+ dΨ/di
)
(ρ+ gy + Ψ)2
=
dgy/di
(ρ+ gy + Ψ)2
·
{
(ρ+ gy) ·
dΨ/di
dgy/di
− Ψ
}
.
(A.34)
It then follows that
d
(
Ψ
ρ+gy+Ψ
)
di
≷ 0⇔ (ρ+ gy) ·
dΨ/di
dgy/di
≶ Ψ ⇔
dgy/di
dΨ/di
≷
Ψ
ρ+ gy
, (A.35)
where the inequality applies the condition dgy/di < 0. Differentiating Ψ = [(1− α)(1− Γ)/α+ 1][ϕ/(1+
i+ Γϕ)] with respect to i yields
dΨ
di
= −
ϕ [(−α− αi+ i+ ϕ+ 1)Γ′(i)− (1− α)Γ(i) + 1]
α[ϕΓ(i) + i+ 1]2
. (A.36)
Combining dgy/di derived from (24) with dΨ/di, we can show
dgy/di
dΨ/di
= −
<0︷ ︸︸ ︷
ln z · Γ′(i) +
<0︷ ︸︸ ︷
d(e/h)
di
γ
ϕ
{1− Γ(1− α) + Γ′(i)[ϕ+ (1+ i)(1− α)]}︸ ︷︷ ︸
Θ
·
α
[ϕΓ(i) + i+ 1]2
. (A.37)
To examine value of Θ, we insert Γ(i) into Θ such that
Θ =
α
{
−ρα2(1+ i)2 + α(1+ i)[ρ(1+ i) + ϕ(i+ 2z− 1)] + ϕ(z− 1)(z− 1− ρ− ϕ)
}
ϕ(α+ αi+ z− 1)2
,
and differentiate Θ with respect to i yields
dΘ
di
=
2α2(z− 1)(ρ+ ϕ)[(1− α)(1+ i) + ϕ]
ϕ(z− 1+ α+ iα)3
> 0, (A.38)
which means that Θ is monotonically increasing in i. We know that i is restricted to lie within the range
[0, iˆ], where iˆ = [ϕ(z− 1)]/(αρ)− 1 to ensure Γ ≥ 0. Therefore, the maximum of Θ is
Θ|i=iˆ =
ϕ(z− 1)− αρ(ρ− z+ 1)
(z− 1)(ρ+ ϕ)
=
ϕ+ αρ
(
1− ρz−1
)
ρ+ ϕ
> 0, (A.39)
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which holds since the conventional values of z and ρ generally satisfy z− 1 > ρ, and the minimum of Θ is
Θ|i=0 =
α
ϕ(α+ z− 1)2
· {α[(2z− 1) + ρ(1− α)] + ϕ(z− 1)(z− 1− ρ− ϕ)} , (A.40)
which could be negative or positive. Therefore, equations (A.38), (A.39) and (A.40) together imply that
(dgy/di)/(dΨ/di) could be either positive or negative for all i ∈ [0, iˆ].
Case 1. For a sufficiently large and positive (dgy/di)/(dΨ/di), (A.35) means d(Ψ/(ρ+ gy + Ψ))/di > 0,
or equivalently d((ρ+ gy)/Ψ)/di < 0. Thus from (A.33) we have
dσ2I
di
≷ 0⇔
σ2h
σ2d
≷
ρ+ gy
Ψ
. (A.41)
Since d(Ψ/(ρ + gy + Ψ))/di > 0, which implies that (ρ + gy)/Ψ is a decreasing function of i, thus if
σ2h/σ
2
d > [(ρ + gy)/Ψ]|i=0, then dσ
2
I /di > 0 for i ∈ [0, iˆ]. It then predicts a monotonically increasing
relationship between i and σ2I . If σ
2
h/σ
2
d < [(ρ + gy)/Ψ]|i=0, there may exist an i
∗ such that σ2h/σ
2
d <
[(ρ+ gy)/Ψ] for 0 < i < i∗, and σ2h/σ
2
d > [(ρ+ gy)/Ψ] for i
∗
< i < iˆ, which together predict a U-shaped
relationship between i and σ2I ; alternatively, σ
2
I may also be monotonically decreasing in i for i ∈ [0, iˆ].
Case 2. For a negative or an insufficiently large positive (dgy/di)/(dΨ/di), we have d(Ψ/(ρ + gy +
Ψ))/di < 0, or equivalently d((ρ+ gy)/Ψ)/di > 0. Then (A.33) implies
dσ2I
di
≷ 0⇔
σ2h
σ2d
≶
ρ+ gy
Ψ
. (A.42)
Since d(Ψ/(ρ + gy + Ψ))/di < 0 indicates that (ρ + gy)/Ψ is increasing in i, thus if σ2h/σ
2
d < [(ρ +
gy)/Ψ]|i=0, then dσ
2
I /di < 0 holds for i ∈ [0, iˆ], which implies a monotonically increasing relationship
between i and σ2I . If σ
2
h/σ
2
d > [(ρ+ gy)/Ψ]|i=0, there may exist an i
∗∗ such that dσ2I /di < 0 for 0 < i < i
∗∗,
and dσ2I /di > 0 for i
∗∗
< i < iˆ, predicting a U-shaped effect of i on σ2I . Alternatively, σ
2
I may also be
monotonically decreasing in i for i ∈ [0, iˆ].
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